Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Priscila Honório Evangelista de Souza Author-Name-First: Priscila Honório Evangelista Author-Name-Last: de Souza Author-Name: Mauricio Bugarin Author-Name-First: Mauricio Author-Name-Last: Bugarin Title: Promoção da Concorrência em Leilões de Espectro: Uma Análise de Mecanismos com Direito de Preferência para Entrantes Abstract: Este artigo analisa como diferentes formatos de leilões de espectro afetam três objetivos regulatórios centrais: arrecadação, eficiência alocativa e promoção da entrada. Combinando modelagem teórica e simulações de Monte Carlo, comparam-se dois benchmarks clássicos (SPA e FPA) e quatro mecanismos regulatórios, incluindo propostas inovadoras com direito de preferência para entrantes. Os resultados revelam que mecanismos híbridos com reserva endógena e direito de preferência superam alternativas tradicionais, conciliando metas de arrecadação e inclusão competitiva. Entre eles, o Mecanismo D aproxima-se da fronteira eficiente em termos de receita e alocação, enquanto o Mecanismo C maximiza a entrada com perdas moderadas de arrecadação. Em contraste, formatos baseados apenas em exclusão de incumbentes (set-asides) apresentam desempenho frágil, sobretudo sob assimetria. Ao quantificar esses trade-offs, o estudo oferece subsídios práticos para reguladores e contribui para o debate sobre desenho ótimo de leilões em mercados concentrados, apontando caminhos para políticas públicas que promovam concorrência sem comprometer eficiência e arrecadação. Creation-Date: 2025-12-16 Number: 122/2025 Classification-JEL: D44, L96, L51 Keywords: regulação econômica, inclusão digital, leilões de espectro, teoria dos leilões, direito de preferência DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23536566 File-URL: https://zenodo.org/api/records/23536566/files/eprg-wp-2025-122.pdf/content File-Format: Application/pdf Handle: RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:1222025 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Roberto Aragão Neto Author-Name-First: Roberto Author-Name-Last: Aragão Neto Title: Mayors within Electoral or Legislative Coalitions? Pre-Electoral Agreements in Brazilian Municipal Legislatures Abstract: This work examines whether parties politically connected to the elected mayor have a higher probability of securing the local council presidency at the beginning of the legislative cycle. Results underscore that the support of the Executive branch has a significant causal e!ect on the choice of the local Speaker. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that, in Municipalities, the government based on legislative coalitions observed at the federal level falls behind a mechanism of pre-electoral agreements, especially electoral coalitions. Taking advantage of these agreements, mayors influence the choice of the local council president, which allows the Executive to o!set the absence of institutions that are inherent to the legislative coalition government. To investigate this issue, we assembled a novel dataset on the party a"liation of more than 3,600 Brazilian local councils in 2021, which we paired with a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) based on the 2020 mayoral elections in Brazil. Creation-Date: 2025-11-21 Number: 121/2025 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23537234 File-URL: https://zenodo.org/api/records/23537234/files/eprg-wp-2025-121.pdf/content File-Format: Application/pdf Handle: RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:1212025 Template-Type: ReDIF-Paper 1.0 Author-Name: Guilherme Paiva Pinto Author-Name-First: Guilherme Author-Name-Last: Paiva Pinto Author-Name: Mauricio Bugarin Author-Name-First: Mauricio Author-Name-Last: Bugarin Author-Name: Rodrigo Schneider Author-Name-First: Rodrigo Author-Name-Last: Schneider Title: Politics and Public Banks: BNDES Loans to Local Governments in Brazil Abstract: This study advances a quantitative political economy analysis of development banking within federative systems, focusing on Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). Moving beyond traditional fiscal transfer models, we investigate the mechanisms through which federal credit operations are allocated to municipal governments, emphasizing the political incentives that influ ence these disbursements. We adapt the Strategic Partisan Transfers Hypothesis (SPTH) to the development banking context, formalizing the interaction between federal, state, and local political alignments within Brazil’s regulatory structure. Using an extensive panel dataset and a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), we provide empirical evidence that double-aligned municipalities—those aligned with the president’s party but governed by an opposition-aligned state—have a higher probability of receiving federal loans. The RDD design, by leveraging quasi-random variation in close mayoral elections, addresses the limitations of panel models and corrects their tendency to underestimate the true causal effect of mayor-president alignment, particularly in the absence of state-level alignment. Our empirical strategy incorporates detailed controls reflecting the institutional decision-making processes governing municipal access to credit, ensuring that our findings account for both political and bureaucratic determinants of development finance distribution. Creation-Date: 2025-06-26 Number: 120/2025 Classification-JEL: H77, G21, D72, H81 Keywords: development banks, Political economy, political economy, intergovernmental transfers, Brazil, regression discontinuity design, partisan alignment DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23541645 File-URL: https://zenodo.org/api/records/23541645/files/eprg-wp-2025-120.pdf/content File-Format: Application/pdf Handle: RePEc:gvn:eprgwp:1202025